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On the efficiency of ‘single window’
Athreya, Krishna; Bishnu, Monisankar - In: Economic Theory 43 (2010) 2, pp. 207-226
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008515304
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Petty corruption: A game-theoretic approach
Lambert-Mogiliansky, Ariane; Majumdar, Mukul; Radner, Roy - 2008
The paper explores a game-theoreticmodel of petty corruption involving a sequence of entrepreneurs and a track of bureaucrats. Each entrepreneur's project is approved if and only if it is cleared by each bureaucrat. The project value is stochastic; its value is observed only by the entrepreneur,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010292052
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Petty corruption : a game-theoretic approach
Lambert-Mogiliansky, Ariane (contributor);  … - 2008
The paper explores a game-theoreticmodel of petty corruption involving a sequence of entrepreneurs and a track of bureaucrats. Each entrepreneur's project is approved if and only if it is cleared by each bureaucrat. The project value is stochastic; its value is observed only by the entrepreneur,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003810143
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Petty Corruption: A Game-Theoretic Approach
Lambert-Mogiliansky, Ariane; Majudar, Mukul; Radner, Roy - Center for Analytic Economics, Department of Economics - 2008
The paper explores a game-theoretic model of petty corruption involving a sequence of entrepreneurs and a track of bureaucrats. Each entrepreneur's project is approved if and only if it is cleared by each bureaucrat. The project value is stochastic; its value is observed only by the entrepreneur,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005103205
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The Pitfalls of a Partially Honest Bureaucracy: Bribery, Inefficiency, and Bureaucratic Delay
Ahlin, Chris; Bose, Pinaki - Vanderbilt University Department of Economics - 2002
honest bureaucracy results in inefficiency. This can take the form of both misallocation and bureaucratic delay, both of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005585308
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The marginal rate of corruption in public programs: Evidence from India
Niehaus, Paul; Sukhtankar, Sandip - In: Journal of Public Economics 104 (2013) C, pp. 52-64
Optimal fiscal policy depends on the marginal benefits of public spending. In developing countries corrupt officials often embezzle funds, so optimal policy should reflect marginal corruption. We analyze marginal corruption in the context of a statutory wage increase in India's employment...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011056217
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Inefficiency and social exclusion in a coalition formation game: Experimental evidence
Okada, Akira; Riedl, Arno - 1999
This paper reports the results of experiments involving a 3-person coalition formation game with an ultimatum bargaining character. The grand coalition was always the efficient coalition decision, whereas the values of the 2-person coalitions are varied such that they lead to an efficiency loss...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010291918
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Quantifying inefficiency in incomplete asset markets
Tirelli, Mario; Turner, Sergio - 2007
It is known that the incompleteness of asset markets causes inefficiency in almost every equilibrium. Yet unexplored is … the ”size” of this inefficiency. The size of a Pareto improvement is the total willingness to pay for it, out of current … consumption. Inefficiency is the maximum size of any Pareto improving reallocation. Inefficiency of US consumption in middle age …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010318933
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Inefficiency and social exclusion in a coalition formation game : experimental evidence
Okada, Akira; Riedl, Arno - 1999 - This version: February, 1999
This paper reports the results of experiments involving a 3-personcoalitionformation game with an ultimatumbargaining character. The grand coalition was always the efficientcoalition,whereas the values of the 2-personcoalitions are varied such that they lead to an efficiency loss inthe range...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011301150
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On the Efficiency of Partial Information in Elections
Eguia, Jon X.; Nicolò, Antonio - Collegio Carlo Alberto, Università degli Studi di Torino - 2011
We study the relation between the electorate's information about candidates' policy platforms during an election, and the subsequent provision of inefficient local public goods (pork) by the winning candidate. More information does not lead to better outcomes. We show that the efficient outcome...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009421460