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How Large Are the Welfare Costs of Tax Competition?
Parry, Ian W.H. - 2001
perfectly competitive, or they behave in part as a revenue-maximizing Leviathan. There has been very little empirical work on … effects using a model that incorporates the possibility of Leviathan behavior, strategic behavior by governments, monopsony … fairly small, and even these costs can disappear fairly quickly when some weight is attached to the possibility of Leviathan …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009445432
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Markets for tradable emission permits with fiscal competition
BRECHET, Thierry; PERALTA, Susana - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), … - 2012
We model a non-cooperative energy tax setting game amongst countries who join an international market in which firms trade emission permits. Countries can auction a share of their permit endowment and issue the remainder for free to a representative firm. Each country's regulator has a double...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010927714
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Equalisation and Fiscal Competition
Rizzo, Leonzio - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2000
The paper’s aim is to link two different issues: equalization and fiscal competition. In the model there are two regions: the first one has rich citizens and the other one has poor citizens. Regional representatives in a federal Council must decide on the introduction of an equalization...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005260188
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The Race for Polluting Permits
Brechet, Thierry; Peralta, Susana - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2007
International markets for tradable emission permits (TEP) co-exist with national energy taxation. A firm trading emission permits in the international market also pays energy taxes in its host country, thus creating an interaction between the international TEP-market and national energy taxes....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005666994
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The race for polluting permits
BRECHET, Thierry; PERALTA, Susana - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), … - 2007
International markets for tradable emission permits (TEP) co-exist with national energy taxation. A firm trading emission permits in the international market also pays energy taxes in its host country, thus creating an interaction between the international TEP-market and national energy taxes....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005043457
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Social insurance and labor mobility : a political economy approach
CREMER, Helmuth; PESTIEAU, Pierre - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), … - 1996
This paper presents a political economy approach to payroll tax competition between countries adopting different systems of social insurance. It considers two such systems: the Bismarckian one where benefits are partially linked to payroll taxes and the Beveridgean one where benefits are fiat. A...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005043670
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On the desirability of tax coordination when countries compete in taxes and infrastructure
Han, Yutao; Pieretti, Patrice; Zou, Benteng - 2013
In our paper, we demonstrate that when countries compete in taxes and infrastructure, coordination through a uniform tax rate or a minimum rate does not necessarily create the welfare effects observed under pure tax competition. The divergence is even worse when the competing jurisdictions...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009722522
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On the Desirability of Tax Coordination When Countries Compete in Taxes and Infrastructure
Han, Yutao - 2013
In our paper, we demonstrate that when countries compete in taxes and infrastructure, coordination through a uniform tax rate or a minimum rate does not necessarily create the welfare effects observed under pure tax competition. The divergence is even worse when the competing jurisdictions...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013082332
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Relaxing Tax Competition through Public Good Differentation
Zissimos, Ben; Wooders, Myrna - Department of Economics, University of Warwick - 2005
. The key assumption is that firms vary in the extent to which public good provision reduces costs. We show that Leviathan …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005747115
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Public Good Differentiation and the Intensity of Tax Competition
Zissimos, Ben; Wooders, Myrna - Vanderbilt University Department of Economics - 2003
We show that, in a setting where tax competition promotes efficiency, variation in the extent to which firms can use public goods to reduce costs brings about a reduction in the intensity of tax competition. This in turn brings about a loss of efficiency. In this environment, a `minimum tax'...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005752723