We prove that the recently proposed informational herding models are but special cases of a standard single person experimentation model with myopia. We then re-interpret the incorrect herding outcome as a familiar failure of complete learning in an optimal experimentation problem.

This paper systematically analyses and enriches the observational learning paradigm of Banerjee (1992) and Bikhchandani, Hirscleifer, and Welch (1992).

We explore the constrainned efficient observational learning model - as when individuals care about successors, or are so induced by an informationally- constrained social planner. We find that when the herding externality is correctly internali zed in this fashion, incorrect herds still obtain.

We explore the constrained efficient observational learning model - as when individuals care about successors, or are so induced by an informationlly-constrained social planner. We find that when the herding externality is correctly internalized in this fashion, incorrect herds still obtain. To...

This paper systematically analyzes and enriches the observational learning paradigm of Banerjee (1992) and Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, and Welch (1992).

This paper investigates time consistent preferences where the strategy space consists of a stopping time, and decision-maker also acts under uncertainty. Despite the requirement of identical vNM preferences, it is shown that in addition to the e xponential discounting class identified by Strotz...

I illustrate the convergence to Rubinstein's (1982) bargaining outcome of the solutions of the finite-horizon truncations of that game. The depiction is new, and hopefully instructive, and has the flavour of international trade diagrams.

This paper has pushed Becker's matching insights into a quite plausible search setting. Exploiting the implicit integral equation (10), we gave a thorough characterization of cross-sectional matching patterns in the equilibrium and constrained s ocial optimum of a frictional matching model. In...