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A voting procedure is candidate stable if no candidate would prefer to withdraw from an election when all of the other … stability is incompatible with some other desirable properties of voting procedures. This article shows that Grether and Plott …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005034028
The requirement that a voting procedure be immune to the strategic withdrawal of a candidate for election can be … this candidate stability property are incompatible with some other desirable properties of voting procedures. This article …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005597880
A desirable property of a voting procedure is that it be immune to the strategic withdrawal of a candidate for election … condition is incompatible with some other desirable properties of voting procedures. This article shows that Grether and Plott …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005729663
This paper investigates the social preferences over labor market flexibility, in a general equilibrium model of dynamic labor demand where the productivity of active firms evolves as a Geometric Brownian motion. A key result demonstrated is that how the economy responds to shocks, i.e....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010672391
This paper investigates the social preferences over labor market exibility, in a general equilibrium model of dynamic labor demand. We demonstrate that how the economy responds to productivity shocks depends on the power of labor to extract rents and on the status quo level of the firing cost....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011148611
, under the hypothesis of majority voting. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005509836
Consider a committee that in the past has made a promise not to confiscate the profits from a foreign investor. After the investment has taken place, there is a material benefit if the committee decides to default on the earlier promise. But there are also some small moral costs for those who...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010306978
each district. We analyze the Markov perfect equilibrium under different voting q-rules where q is the number of yes votes … experiment with fiveperson committees that compares three alternative voting rules: unanimity (q=5); majority (q=3); and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010307744
interest in those parameters, voting patterns suggest significant influence of cooperative orientation, political attitudes …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011310728
Consider a voting procedure where countries, states, or districts comprising a union each elect representatives who … characterization of the efficient voting rule in terms of the weights assigned to different districts and the voting threshold (how … correlation structure of agents preferences, we analyze how voting weights relate to the population size of a country. We then …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011324952