This paper examines the location of three vertically-linked firms. In a spatial economy composed of two regions, a monopolist firm supplies an input to two consumer goods firms that compete in quantities. The interaction between the firms is modelled by means of a three-stage game, where the...

This paper examines the equilibrium of location of N vertically-linked firms. In a spatial economy composed of two regions, a monopolist firm supplies an input to N consumer goods firms that compete in quantities. It was concluded that, when there are increases in the transport cost of the...

In a model of spatial competition, we analyse the equilibrium outcomes in markets where the product price is exogenous. Using an extended version of the Hotelling model, we assume that firms choose their locations and the quality of the product they supply. We derive the optimal price set by a...

We analyze firms' location choices in a Hotelling model with two-dimensional consumer heterogeneity, along addresses and transport cost parameters (flexibility). Firms can price discriminate based on perfect data on consumer addresses and (possibly) imperfect data on consumer flexibility. We...

We analyse a two-stage location-quantity game with many firms and two regions. We show that the firms will never agglomerate in the same location if transportation is costly between the regions. We also analyse the effects of differences in market size and economic integration on the allocation...

We study a linear location model (Hotelling, 1929) in which n (with n ≥ 2) boundedly rational players follow (noisy) myopic best-reply behavior. We show through numerical and mathematical analysis that such players spend almost all the time clustered together near the center, re-establishing...

We analyze firms' location choices in a Hotelling model with two-dimensional consumer heterogeneity, along addresses and transport cost parameters (flexibility). Firms can price discriminate based on perfect data on consumer addresses and (possibly) imperfect data on consumer flexibility. We...

We study a linear location model (Hotelling, 1929) in which n (with n = 2) boundedly rational players follow (noisy) myopic best-reply behavior. We show through numerical and mathematical analysis that such players spend almost all the time clustered together near the center, re-establishing the...

In spatial competition firms are likely to be uncertain about demand when launching products either because of shifting demographics or of asymmetric information about preferences. This paper considers two types of prices: those set on prior information and flexible prices which adjust across...

In this paper a game theoretic model is employed to analyze the relationship between strategic location decision of firms in the supply chain considering the role of horizontal and vertical knowledge spillovers, and numerical approach is applied to characterize the equilibria of the considered...