Are labels good or bad for consumers and firms? The answers may seem straightforward since labels improve information, yet economic theory reveals situations where their introduction reduces the welfare of, at least, some market participants. This essay reviews the theoretical literature on...

Contractual inefficiencies within supply chains increase an input price above its marginal cost, therefore they are considered detrimental to consumer surplus. We argue that such inefficiencies may be beneficial to consumers in quality-differentiated markets. Indeed, enhancing contractual...

In this paper we show that, in the presence of buyer and seller power, a monopolist can enter into a costly contractual relationship with a low-quality supplier with the sole intention of improving its bargaining position relative to a high-quality supplier, without ever selling the good...

The paper analyses the economic consequences of labeling in a setting with two vertically related markets. Labeling on the downstream market affects upstream price competition through two effects : a differentiation effect and a ranking effect. The magnitude of these two effects determines who...

The food distribution and retail sectors in Quebec are highly concentrated and integrated as large food distributors are also involved in food retailing. As such, they are competing with small grocery and convenience stores they sell inputs to. A review of the industry suggests that there are...

We analyze credence goods markets in the case of two firms. Consumers know that the quality of the good varies but do not know which firm is of high quality. First, we show that the high quality producer may be unable to monopolize the market, or even to survive in some cases, in situations...

Are labels good or bad for consumers and firms? In this essay we analyze the label's nature as information revealing mechanism and explore the theoretical literature on labeling with respect to the following issues: i) the effects of labels on market structure, ii) the distortions due to the...

The existing literature in expert-customer relationship concludes that when: i) consumers are homogenous, ii) consumers are committed with an an expert once this one made a recommendation, and iii) the type of treatment provided is verifiable, an expert finds optimal to serve efficiently his...

This paper considers the effects of the opportunity to change partners on communication. We experiment a standard cheap talk game where a player observes a private forecast before disclosing it (truthfully or untruthfully) in a message that he/she sends to his/her partner. Two treatments are...

This paper considers the effects of labels in a vertically differentiated duopoly. A label certifies the level of a product's measurable characteristic. It is shown that the certification label chosen by a private (for profit) certifier is lower than both the socially optimal and the firm's...