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In this essay on Masahiko Aoki's recent study of Japanese corporate governance, we argue that he and others misdescribe Japan on several fundamental dimensions. First, Japanese firms and employees choose neither to arrange implicit life-time employment contracts nor to invest heavily in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005187110
Change is in the air in Japan, claim many observers: the government is radically deregulating crucial sectors of the economy, the large firms are unwinding their keiretsu corporate groups, and firms and banks are dismantling their main bank arrangements. Some observers see all three as exogenous...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005187128
The Japanese antitrust agency (the J-FTC) holds a jurisdictional monopoly over most issues. Because overlapping jurisdictions would enable politicians to gauge relative bureaucratic performance, this monopoly prevents politicians from monitoring the agency on most issues. In response, J-FTC...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005187135
Observers of modern transitional economies urge firms there to ignore stock markets. Stock markets simply will not work in such environments, they explain. Firms should instead rely on debt finance, particularly bank debt. Only then will they be able to keep principal-agent (i.e.,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005187139
Most of what we collectively think we know about the Japanese economy is urban legend. In fact -- * The keiretsu do not exist, and never did. An entrepreneurial "research institute" in the 1950s created the rosters to sell to Marxist economists looking for the "monopoly capital" that their...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005187175
Despite the many economic studies documenting the problems governments face in trying to control or guide economic growth, the literature on postwar Japan posits an exception: during the first three years after World War II, the Japanese government (working with the Allied occupation)...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005628867
In 1985, Demsetz & Lehn argued both that the optimal corporate ownership structure was firm-specific, and that market competition would drive firms toward that optimum. Because ownership was endogenous to expected performance, they cautioned, any regression of profitability on ownership patterns...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005465292
In a series of pathbreaking articles, Sylla argues that successful economies experience "financial revolutions" before they undergo their periods of rapid growth. In turn, governments generate these revolutions by putting public finance in order, and thereby giving private investors the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005465309
The Japanese "main bank system" figures prominently in the recent literature on "relationship banking." By most accounts, the main bank epitomizes relationship finance: traditionally, every large Japanese firm had one, and that bank monitored the firm, participated in its governance, acted as...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005465320
According to modern contract theory, how firms structure their trading patterns and governance structures will depend both on the size of any relationship-specific investments they make, and on the feasibility of detailed contracts. Suppose contracts are hard to draft and enforce, but firm A...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005465340