The performance of individual farm yield and area yield crop insurance programs is evaluated for a representative Iowa corn farm using numerical optimization of expected utility and simulation techniques. Several different contract design features are studied, including the nature of the yield...

We argue that existing agricultural insurance valuation models are limited either because they are not complete equilibrium models that price the non-diversifiable risk involved in issuing insurance contracts, or they assume complete markets which appears at odds with most applications of...

The vast majority of previous studies on farmers' optimal risk management behavior have used static models and on the most part ignored use of borrowing and lending as an alternative method of managing risk In this paper we develop a stylized multi-period risk management model for a risk averse...

Most previous research on post-harvest grain storage by farmers has assumed risk-neutral behavior and/or made restrictive assumptions about underlying price probability distributions. In this study, we solve the optimal on-farm storage problem for a risk-averse farmer under more general...

Participation in federal crop insurance programs has been encouraged through premium subsidies. The current subsidy depends on contract features as well as coverage levels. This type of subsidy rule causes farmers to choose contract designs and coverages that are not efficient for managing risk,...

Identifies the characteristics of grain elevators that had railroad contracts during 1983-1985 using a logistic model designed for complex survey designs. Factors which influence the probability of a grain elevator participating in an origin contract with a railroad; Use of data from Kansas and...