This paper presents a counterexample to the Miyagiwa ((1991) American Economic Review 81, 1320–1328) claim that discriminatory government procurement policy is ineffective as a protectionist device, when the goods are also consumed by the private sector. The procurement sector is a...

Any legislative framework is likely to generate different institutions or norms of behavior which the legislator occasionally could have never foreseen. I suggested a general pattern, on which inefficient, if stable, norms or institutions called institutional traps would form.

The aim of this paper is to assess how three seminal coordination failure models (Diamond ((1982)1991), Howitt (1985) and Roberts (1987) have fared against ‘Keynes’s programme’. The first part of the paper characterises Keyne’s programme as consisting of the following four objectives :...

Presidential address for the Twelfth World Congress of the International Economic Association, summarising semi-formally the author's recent work and concerns. Uncertainty and incomplete markets breed demand volatility as well as price and wage rigidities. The conjunction of these leads to...

This paper introduces the class of mean defined supermodular games. The characteristic feature of these games is that, given an order on the strategy sets of the players, the payoff to each player depends on his own strategy and the average of the population play. We characterise the set of the...

This paper presents a counterexample to the Miyagiwa (1991) claim that discriminatorygovernment procurement policy is ineffective as a protectionist device, when the goods are alsoconsumed by the private sector. The procurement sector is a homogeneous product Cournot-Nashduopoly, with a home and...

In this paper the existence of unemployment is partly explained as being the result of coordination failures. This is achieved by considering a standard general equilibrium model and splitting the set of commodities in two groups. The first group contains commodities like gold. The prices of...

In this paper the existence of unemployment is partly explained as being the result of coordination failures. It is shown that as a result of self-fulfilling pessimistic expectations, even at Walrasian prices, a continuum of equilibria results, among which an equilibrium with approximately no...

In decentralised market economies, supply-constrained equilibria may persist as coordination failures, sustained but not caused by price rigidities. This feature may be arbitrarily severe, even at prices com- patible with competitive equilibrium. The supply-constraints may originate in rational...

These two volumes of readings attempt to bring some degree of structure to a relatively diffuse field. Because of the sheer volume of high-quality work in development economics research, they are intended as a sampling of work at the frontier of the field, rather than as a comprehensive...