We address the practical question of whether investors and researchers are likely to make invalid inferences about fund manager performance when using the wrong model and/or benchmark. We consider three well-known models, those of Jensen (1968), Treynor and Mazuy (1966), and Henriksson and...

This paper examines the implications for mutual fund performance measurement of two likely sources of specification error. We compare three well-known models, those of Jensen (1968), Treynor and Mazuy (1966), and Henriksson and Merton (1981), and two commonly-used timing benchmarks, the Samp;P...

We investigate market behavior in a setting where managerial incentives to manipulate earnings and market price should be apparent ex ante to market participants. We find evidence of abnormally low discretionary accruals in the period following announcements of cancellations of executive stock...

While existing literature on equity-based compensation is focused heavily on stock option and restricted stock awards that carry simple time-based vesting restrictions, we find that more complicated performance-based vesting provisions are quite common. We construct and analyze a novel dataset...

This paper provides evidence on a previously unidentified source of managerial incentives: concerns about post-retirement board service. Both the likelihood that a retired CEO serves on his own board two years after departure, as well as the likelihood of serving as an outside director on other...