This note reconsiders the problem of managerial incentives in the context of an unionized Nash-Cournot oligopoly. It is hightlighted that managerial incentives weaken union power at industry equilibrium, although, as a symptom of a prisoner dilemma, unions are not reluctant to the existence of...

Purpose – This study aims to examine the industry reaction as determined by stock returns when firms in the electric services industry announced receipt of Going concern audit opinions from 1984 through 1991. Design/methodology/approach – The study utilizes standard event study methodology...

Solves von Stackelberg equilibria in a Bertrand-Edgeworth duopoly game. Shows that, initially, the environment is characterized by efficient rationing and capacity constraints. Since interest lies in sustaining monopoly outcomes from non-co-operative behaviour, introduces the buyout option,...

Reviews the international response to Marktform und Gleichgewicht, and questions the reactions of astonishment by some critics, including Scherer, concerning Stackelberg’s explanation of disequilibrium of certain market structures. Defends Stackelberg’s standpoint by considering the specific...

Discusses Heinrich von Stackelberg as a mathematical economist, referring to his book Marktform und Gleichgewicht. Presents the main theories of rivalrous interaction among business firms and the problems of oligopoly and monopoly. Notes how Stackelberg used indifference curves to map the...

Purpose – This paper aims at theoretical exploration of price and quantity setting behaviors of a monopolist encountering uncertain product demand within the mean-risk frameworks. In the microeconomic literature, the relationships between price and quantity have been traditionally studied...

This paper shows that a monopolistic certifying party can have incentives to disclose revealing information about the agent he is certifying. Using a three-person game-theoretic model and allowing certificate users (buyers) to have noisy estimates of the quality level of the agent being...

In the present paper, a situation in which the unionised monopoly is challenged by a consumer organisation fighting for deregulation is analysed as a standard Tullock rent-seeking contest.