This paper analyzes the links between the internal organization of firms and macroeconomic growth. We present a Schumpeterian growth model in which firms face dynamic agency costs. These agency costs are due to the formation of vertical collusions within the organization. To respond to the...

A monopolist firm sells a single product to a market where the customers may be enticed to accept a delay in when their orders are shipped. The enticement is a discounted price for the product. The market consists of several segments with different degrees of aversion to delays. The firm offers...

This paper tackles the issue of optimum product diversity in an imperfectly competitive market with small of large firms. First, it develops a quadratic utility model of monopolistic competition with horizontal product differentiation which avoids some of the main pitfalls of the S-D-S approach....

We study an endogenous business cycle model with Cournotian monopolistic competition and an endogenous number of firms in each sector. Our model is a simple general equilibrium macroeconomic model introducing overlapping generation both of consumers and firms. Firms strategically decide on...