This paper formulates a model of m-firm complementary monopoly under the assumption of linear demand, constant long-run marginal cost and constant propositions.

This paper derives a general m-firm model of conplementary monopoly. A measure of deadweight welfare loss is then constructed under the simplifying assumptions of linear demand, constant long-run marginal costs, symmetry and constant proportions.

This paper analyses the situation of an incumbent monopoly who has both to signal that her costs are low in order to dissuade entry tomorrow, and that her product has a high quality in order to attract consumers in the current period. The incumbent can use both price and advertising as signals....

A seller sells a good of unknown quality to a buyer. He may certify his product , that is, announce that quality is at least equal to a certification level. If he doesn't observe himself the quality, he must first investigate to discover the quality before taking his certification decision. The...

In this paper we investigate why regulators may wish to open regulated markets to entry by unregulated firms. We adopt Posner's view of regulation as a taxation scheme, whereby regulators set high rates in some markets in order to subsidize other markets.

This paper presents a patent choice model allowing strategic decisions in a sequential game with two agents: a patentholder, who perfectly knows thecharasteristics of the market, and a potential entrant who has no information about the value of demand. We study several Perfect Bayesian...

Two fields of thought evolved simultaneously, but scholars in one ignored the evolution of the other. The first was the theory of monopoly, whose broad nineteenth-century definition narrowed considerably during the twentieth century. Concepts contained in its original incarnation attained...

We examine minimum quality standards (MQS) regulation in vertically differentiated markets with free entry.