This paper uses the geometric analysis in Cornes and Sandler to demonstrate the Lindahl equilibrium when private contributions are subsidised in a non-cooperative setting i.e., in a setting where consumers take as constant the contributions by all others when making their own.

Specialized theoretical and empirical research should in principle be embedded in a unified framework that identifies the relevant interactions among different phenomena, enables an appropriate matching of policy instruments to objectives, and grounds normative analysis in individuals' utilities...

This Handbook entry presents a conceptual, normative overview of the subject of taxation. It emphasizes the relationships among the main functions of taxation—notably, raising revenue, redistributing income, and correcting externalities—and the mapping between these functions and various...

Medicare expenditures as a share of gross domestic product (GDP) are now six times larger than they were in 1967. Forecasts for the next 75 years show that almost $1 of every $5 of GDP could be spent on Medicare. That is unaffordable. Without intervention, Medicare's share of GDP will force some...

The federal government is headed toward a financial crisis as a result of chronic overspending, large deficits, and huge future cost increases in Social Security and Medicare. Social Security and Medicare would be big fiscal challenges even if the rest of the government were lean and efficient,...

We study the residential choice of siblings who are altruistic towards their parents. If some siblings moves further away, he or she can shift some of the burden of takin care for the parents to his or her siblings. Thus, siblings have a strategic incentive to move away that only children do not...

Laboratory experiments by Fudenberg and Pathak (2010), and Vyrastekova, Funaki and Takeuch (2008) show that punishment is able to sustain cooperation in groups even when it is observed only in the end of the interaction sequence. Our results demonstrate that the real power of unobserved...

We analyse two team settings in which one member in a team has stronger incentives to contribute than the others. If contributions constitute a sacrifice for the strong player, the other team members are more inclined to cooperate than if contributions are strictly dominant for the strong...

Laboratory experiments by Fudenberg and Pathak (2010), and Vyrastekova, Funaki and Takeuch (2008) show that punishment is able to sustain cooperation in groups even when it is observed only in the end of the interaction sequence. Our results demonstrate that the real power of unobserved...

We present results from a multiple public goods experiment, where each public good produces benefits only if total contributions to it reach a minimum threshold. The experiment allows us to compare a subject's behavior in a benchmark treatment with a single public good and in treatments with...