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Redistribution of tax resources : a cooperative game theory approach

Calvo, Emilio - In: SERIEs : Journal of the Spanish Economic Association 12 (2021) 4, pp. 633-686

instability. We introduce two budget allocation rules, both borrowed from the cooperative games literature: the balanced …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012694354

Farsighted rationality in hedonic games

Demeze-Jouatsa, G.-Herman; Karos, Dominik - 2021

We consider a hedonic coalition formation game in which at each possible partition any new coalition can decide the probability with which to form and leave the current partition. These probabilities are commonly known so that farsighted players can decide whether or not to support a coalition's...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012659142

Measuring the difficulties in forming a coalition government

Hiller, Tobias - In: Games 14 (2023) 2, pp. 1-15

Electoral thresholds in the context of parliamentary elections are an instrument for preventing the fragmentation of parliaments and facilitate the formation of a coalition government. However, the clauses also introduce distortions and modify the equality of electoral votes in an election. In...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014422490

Training, abilities and the structure of teams

Hiller, Tobias - In: Games 14 (2023) 3, pp. 1-8

the stability of a team. In this paper, we apply the production games approach of cooperative game theory to analyze how …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014426257

Game theoretic foundations of the gately power measure for directed networks

Gilles, Robert Paul; Mallozzi, Lina - In: Games 14 (2023) 5, pp. 1-19

We introduce a new network centrality measure founded on the Gately value for cooperative games with transferable … hierarchical network. The power distribution embedded within a hierarchical network can be represented through appropriate TU-games …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014426676

Dynamic programming for computing power indices for weighted voting games with precoalitions

Staudacher, Jochen; Wagner, Felix; Filipp, Jan - In: Games 13 (2022) 1, pp. 1-17

We study the efficient computation of power indices for weighted voting games with precoalitions amongst subsets of …-of-the-art algorithms for computing the Banzhaf and Shapley-Shubik indices for weighted voting games, we present a framework for fast …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013171847

Competition dynamics in Nigerian aviation industry : a game theoretic approach

Shobande, Olatunji Abdul; Akinbomi, Mobolaji Daniel - In: Future Business Journal 6 (2020) 11, pp. 1-8

Background: This paper develops a game theoretic model that analyses the dynamics of competition among the leading domestic aviation firms in the Nigerian aviation industry. It probes the abilities of the prisoner dilemma to describe the subjective behaviour of the firms, which provide a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012308330

Equilibrium coalitional behavior

Kimya, Mert - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 15 (2020) 2, pp. 669-714

I develop two related solution concepts, equilibrium coalitional behavior and credible equilibrium coalitional behavior, which capture foresight and impose the requirement that each coalition in a sequence of coalitional moves chooses optimally among all its available options. The model does not...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012308618

Quantum-like modelling in game theory : quo vadis? : a brief review

Patra, Sudip; Ghose, Partha - In: Asian journal of economics and banking : AJEB 4 (2020) 3, pp. 49-66

paper aims to explore several quantum games, which are superior compared to their classical counterparts, which means either …. This paper explores all the virtues of simple quantum games, also highlighting some findings of the authors as regards … specific mathematical method, rather explored the well-known quantum probability framework, used for designing quantum games …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012514899

Weighted scoring committees

Mayer, Alexander; Napel, Stefan - In: Games 12 (2021) 4, pp. 1-17

Weighted committees allow shareholders, party leaders, etc. to wield different numbers of votes or voting weights as they decide between multiple candidates by a given social choice method. We consider committees that apply scoring methods such as plurality, Borda, or antiplurality rule. Many...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012698221