Altruism or `regard for others' can encourage self-restraint among generators of negative externalities, thereby mitigating the externality problem. We explore how introducing impure altruism into standard regulatory settings alters regulatory prescriptions. The optimal calibration of both...

Michael Crew and David Parker have compiled a comprehensive, up-to-date and detailed analytical work on leading research issues in the economics of regulation. With contributions from international specialists in economic regulation, the Handbook provides a comprehensive discussion of major...

Anthony Heyes presented Economics and the Environment: Save the Planet or Let It Burn? at an ISCR seminar in April 2007

Enforcement of policy is typically delegated. What sort of mission should the head of an enforcement program be given? When there is more than one firm being regulated their compliance decisions - otherwise completely separate - become linked in a way that depends on that mission. Under some...

Alert programs are central to strategies to reduce the health impacts of air pollution in many jurisdictions. Evidence that they work, however, is sparse - indeed the majority of published studies fail to find a significant impact of alerts on behavior. Alerts particularly seek to influence...

Regulators are sometimes prevented from setting standards on a firm-by-firmbasis. Such restrictions seem inefficient, and rationales for their prevalance have been in terms of politics or fairness. While the requirement that regulation be uniform does not allow the agency to commit to future...