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When will judgement proof injurers take too much precaution?
Dari Mattiacci, Giuseppe; De Geest, Gerrit - In: International review of law and economics 26 (2006) 3, pp. 336-354
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003436449
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Annullable bonuses and penalties
De Geest, Gerrit; Dari Mattiacci, Giuseppe; Siegers, … - In: International review of law and economics 29 (2009) 4, pp. 349-359
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003931719
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Carrots, sticks, and the multiplication effect
Dari Mattiacci, Giuseppe; De Geest, Gerrit - In: The journal of law, economics, & organization 26 (2010) 2, pp. 365-384
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003993461
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Soft regulators, tough judges
De Geest, Gerrit; Dari Mattiacci, Giuseppe - In: Supreme Court economic review 15 (2007), pp. 119-140
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003494866
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Judgment proofness under four different precaution technologies
Dari Mattiacci, Giuseppe; De Geest, Gerrit - In: Journal of institutional and theoretical economics : JITE 161 (2005) 1, pp. 38-56
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002907703
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The filtering effect of sharing rules
Dari Mattiacci, Giuseppe; De Geest, Gerrit - In: The journal of legal studies 34 (2005) 1, pp. 207-237
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003026162
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When will judgment proof injurers take too much precaution?
Dari-Mattiacci, Giuseppe; De Geest, Gerrit - In: International review of law and economics 26 (2006) 3, pp. 336-354
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10007617485
Cover Image
Soft regulators, tough judges
De Geest, Gerrit; Dari-Mattiacci, Giuseppe - In: Supreme Court economic review 15 (2007), pp. 119-140
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009945264
Cover Image
Annullable bonuses and penalties
De Geest, Gerrit; Dari-Mattiacci, Giuseppe; Siegers, … - In: International review of law and economics 29 (2009) 4, pp. 349-360
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008889685
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Annullable bonuses and penalties
De Geest, Gerrit; Dari-Mattiacci, Giuseppe; Siegers, … - In: International Review of Law and Economics 29 (2009) 4, pp. 349-359
An annullable penalty is a sanction that is applied unless monitoring takes place and the agent is found non-shirking. An annullable bonus is a bonus that the agent receives unless he has been monitored and found shirking. Annullable penalties and bonuses stand in contrast with normal penalties...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008521700