We find that dual-class firms experience less underpricing, higher post-IPO institutional ownership, and less frequent control events than single-class firms. Each finding is consistent with the quot;reduced monitoring hypothesisquot; of Brennan and Franks (1997), which explains underpricing as...

Contrary to past literature, active ownership, defined as all officers and directors of the target firm, has no association with target returns. Rather, we find that inside (managerial) ownership has a positive relation with target returns, whereas active-outside (non-managing director)...

This Special Issue pays tribute to the Journal of Corporate Finance (JCF) and its cutting-edge research. We do this by taking stock of the trends of research published in the Journal over the last 25 years, areas being researched currently, and offer some insight into fruitful areas of corporate...

We analyze a sample of dual and single class IPOs to investigate whether empirical estimates of underpricing determinants are consistent across alternative measures of firm size and alternative techniques intended to account for underwriter price stabilization efforts. We find that results from...

This study examines the impact of country-level earnings quality on IPO underpricing. Examining 10,783 IPOs from 37 countries, we find that IPOs are underpriced less in countries where public firms produce higher quality earnings information. This finding persists after controlling for other...

That a link exists between a country's legal system and the size, liquidity, and value of its capital markets is well established. We study how differences in country-level governance impact the underpricing of initial public offerings (IPOs). Examining 4,462 IPOs across 29 countries from...

Corporate governance and firm disclosure are endogenously determined. We exploit locally exogenous variations in corporate governance created by "close-call" governance-related shareholder proposals, using a fuzzy RDD and the techniques developed in text analytics to examine whether better...

We find that the announcement gain to target shareholders from acquisitions is significantly lower if private firm instead of a public firm makes the acquisition. Non-operating firms like private equity funds make the majority of private bidder acquisitions. On average, target shareholders...

CEOs have a potential conflict of interest when their company is acquired: they can bargain to be retained by the acquirer and for private benefits rather than for a higher premium to be paid to the shareholders. We investigate the determinants of target CEO retention by the acquirer and whether...