The interplay of delegated portfolio management and asset management ownership generates a double agency problem that may result on trading to support security prices. We test this hypothesis analyzing the trading patterns of mutual funds affiliated with banks with the stocks of their...

We study the decisions of international asset managers to outsource portfolio management of their funds and we link these decisions to market integration. Using a structural model of selfselection, we endogenize the decision to outsource in a comprehensive sample of international mutual funds...

In Japan, since 2013, Japanese corporate governance reform has been developed by Japanese Government initiatives. This paper provides a theoretical framework for understanding what Japanese corporate governance reform means for Japanese companies by an application of agency theory. Corporate...

We find that ownership by different types of institutional investors has varying implications for future firm misvaluation and governance characteristics. Dedicated institutional investors decrease future firm misvaluation, in both direction and magnitude, relative to fundamentals. In contrast,...

Recent trends in shareholder empowerment have spurred a heated debate whether empowered shareholders will ultimately cure corporate ills or adversely affect corporate fortunes. While some scholars claim that further strides in empowering shareholders will improve managerial accountability and...

Does corporate governance structure matter for firm value? We develop a model in which the allocation of control rights between shareholders and managers (“governance structure”) affects managers' incentive to invest (strong governance tightens managerial freedom and weak governance loosens...

We document the role of investors at the periphery of control - "quasi-insiders" - in corporate governance. These agents, who include founders, former CEOs, and other former officers, launch activist campaigns in smaller and worse-performing firms than other activists, and use aggressive tactics...

This paper studies institutional investors' incentives to be engaged shareholders. We measure incentives as the increase in an institution's cash flow (management fees) when a stockholding increases 1% in value, considering both the direct effect on assets under management and the indirect...

In this paper, we propose a model including the trading stage (acquisition of shares and blockholder disclosure) and the governance stage of activism. We analyze the blockholder's timing of disclosure, allowing for a strategic behavior. In some cases, the blockholder voluntarily renounces to use...