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Environmental enforcement with endogenous ambient monitoring
Franckx, Laurent - 2002
commitment power has a very strong impact on the value of prior information. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011335754
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Ambient inspections in environmental enforcement: an extension
Franckx, Laurent - Centrum voor Economische Studiën, Faculteit Economie … - 2001
We consider an inspection game between an arbitrary number of polluting firms and an agency who can choose to monitor ambient pollution. We obtain an equilibrium where all firms comply with the same probability and where the inspection agency inspects all firms individually if ambient pollution...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005503939
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Environmental enforcement with endogenous ambient monitoring
Franckx, Laurent - 2002
commitment power has a very strong impact on the value of prior information. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011597940
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Ambient environmental inspections and commitment towards enforcement policies: substitutes or complements?
Franckx, Laurent - In: Topics in Economic Analysis & Policy 2 (2002) 1, pp. 1026-1026
assume that the agency can commit to inspection probabilities. We show that this commitment power radically changes the value … of ambient inspections.If the legislator imposes an infinite fine, commitment power and ambient inspections are perfect … the fine, ambient inspections and commitment power are complements. Indeed, if the agency does not conduct ambient …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005579720
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ambient environmental inspections in repeated enforcement games
Franckx, Laurent - Centrum voor Economische Studiën, Faculteit Economie … - 2001
We consider an environmental inspection agency who credibly commits to a permanent observation of ambient pollution at the property line of individual firms. In this setting, standard results in the theory of repeated games generalize to enforcement games. The inspection agency obtains partial...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005808094
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Discretionary enforcement and strategic interactions between firms, regulatory agency and justice department: a theoretical and empirical investigation
Germani, Anna Rita; Morone, Andrea; Morone, Piergiuseppe; … - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2013
This paper presents a game theoretic morphological analysis of the U.S. environmental authorities’ (i.e., EPA and DOJ) behavioural mechanisms, based on strategic interactions among the players. The models explore the role of discretion that such authorities enjoy, either in deciding how to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011258128
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Enforcement and over-compliance
Shimshack, Jay P.; Ward, Michael B. - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2007
Economists generally view environmental enforcement as a tool to secure compliance with regulations. This paper demonstrates that credible enforcement significantly increases statutory over-compliance with regulations as well. We find that many plants with discharges typically below legally...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008684901
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Environmental Enforcement in Decentralised Governance Systems: Toward a Nationwide Level Playing Field
Mazur, Eugene - Environment Directorate, Organisation de Coopération … - 2011
This report analyses approaches to managing environmental compliance monitoring and enforcement in several OECD countries with decentralised systems of environmental governance. It focuses principally on strategies and instruments for promoting consistency in the implementation of national...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009643454
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The Environmental Enforcement in the Civil and the Common Law Systems. A Case on the Economic Effects of Legal Institutions
Germani, Anna Rita - Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche, Matematiche e … - 2007
This paper aims to give a comparative analysis on the different enforcement approaches in respect to both civil and common law systems (i.e. Europe vs. USA) by analyzing some crucial aspects of their underlying normative systems. Therefore, the role of the juridical institutions in these two...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005434778
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Environmental Enforcement with Endogenous Ambient Monitoring
Franckx, Laurent - In: Environmental & Resource Economics 30 (2005) 2, pp. 195-220
Environmental Economics and Management 43, 71–92, 2002b, Topics in Economic Analysis Policy 2(1), Article 1) show that commitment …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005684316