We view a contract as a list of outcomes. Ex ante, the parties commit not to consider outcomes not on the list, i.e., these are "ruled out". Ex post, they freely bargain over outcomes on the list, i.e., the contract specifies no mechanism to structure their choice; in this sense outcomes on the...

This is a new formal framework for the theory of competitive equilibrium and its applications.Our "short-run approach" means the calculation of long-run producer optimaand general equilibria from the short-run solutions to the producer's profit maximizationprogramme and its dual. The marginal...

Building on previous studies on perceptions of inequality, welfare and risk we investigate the structure of individuals' rankings of uncertain prospects in terms of risk and their relationship to individual preferences. We examine three interlinked propositions that are fundamental to the...

According to standard theory founded on Harsanyi (1953, 1955) a social welfarefunction can be appropriately based on the individual's approach to choice underuncertainty. We investigate whether people really do rank distributions according tothe same principles irrespective of whether the...

The intra-distributional mobility of German income dynamics is analysed using GSOEP. Transition probabilities are found to be time-varying. The tested models comprise various mixed Markov chains in discrete time and a non-stationary mover-stayer model is proposed. In order to explain the...

Distributional dominance criteria are commonly applied to draw welfare inferences about comparisons, but conclusions drawn from empirical implementations of dominance criteria may be influenced by data contamination. We examine a non-parametric approach to refining Lorenz-type comparisons and...