AbstractThe following sections are included:Bargaining Power GamesExamplesThe Relation of this Model to Some PredecessorsMatching Games and Bargaining PowerBargaining Power NTU Games in Partition Function FormReflectionsSummary

AbstractThe following sections are included:Shapley's “Algorithm”Maskin's ProposalAn Extended Shapley AlgorithmSome ExamplesAn Illustrative ExampleA Game with Strong Positive ExternalitiesA Game with Mild Positive ExternalitiesA Game that is not SuperadditiveThe Enigma GameAn Exceptional...

AbstractThe following sections are included:A Primer for Cooperative Games in Extensive FormFurther ExamplesAn Example with Demographic ChangeA More General DiscussionChapter Summary and Conclusions

AbstractJohn F. Nash, Jr., submitted his Ph. D. dissertation entitled Non-Cooperative Games to Princeton University in 1950. Read it 58 years later, and you will find the germs of various later developments in game theory. Some of these are presented below, followed by a discussion of dynamic...

AbstractAn elementary proof, based on linear duality, is provided for the existence of correlated equilibria in finite games. The existence result is then extended to infinite games, including some that possess no Nash equilibria.

AbstractWe study the problem of reaching a pure Nash equilibrium in multi-person games that are repeatedly played under the assumption of uncoupledness: every player knows only his own payoff function. We consider strategies that can be implemented by finite-state automata, and characterize the...

AbstractThe following sections are included:Superadditive Games in Coalition Function FormThe CoreShapley ValueThe NucleolusA Comparative PerspectiveChapter Summary

In social choice settings with linear preferences, random dictatorship is known to be the only social decision scheme satisfying strategyproofness and ex post efficiency. When also allowing indifferences, random serial dictatorship (RSD) is a well-known generalization of random dictatorship that...

The paper introduces the assumption of costly information acquisition to the theory of mechanism design for matching allocation problems. It is shown that the assumption of endogenous information acquisition greatly changes some of the cherished results in that theory: in particular, the...