Consider a finite-state stochastic process governed by an unknown objective probability distribution. Observing the system, a forecaster assigns subjective probabilities to future states. The resulting subjective forecast merges to the objective distribution if, with time, the forecasted...

This review presents the well-known notion of merging, introduced by Blackwell and Dubins, and its later generalizations. While the original concept of merging refers to all future events, the two new concepts, of weak and of almost weak merging, are concerned only with forecasting near-future...

We introduce the concept of -consistent equilibrium where each player plays a -best response after every history reached with positive probability. In particular, an -consistent equilibrium induces an -equilibrium in any subgame reached along the play path. The existence of -consistent...

In a fuzzy cooperative game the playersmay choose to partially participate in a coalition. A fuzzy coalition consists of a group of participating players along with their participation level. The characteristic function of a fuzzy game specifies the worth of each such coalition. This paper...

We present a model of anonymous collective bargaining where individuals preferences and information may be significantly interdependent. We show that the bargaining outcome becomes independent of individuals preferences and information as the bargaining group increases in size. As a corollary,...

In Ellsberg paradox, decision makers that are partially informed about the actual probability distribution violate the expected utility paradigm. This paper develops a theory of decision making with a partially specified probability. The paper takes an axiomatic approach using Anscombe-Aumann's...

An administrator is provided with data collected by several practitioners. These data may include inconclusive observations. The administrator is required to form a frequency distribution on the states of nature that would be approved by external auditors as long as it is compatible with the...

Aumann has shown that agents who have a common prior cannot have common knowledge of their posteriors for event E if these posteriors do not coincide. But given an event E, can the agents have posteriors with a common prior such that it is common knowledge that the posteriors for E do coincide?...