certification costs, certification that fully reveals information makes high quality producers better off, but make the entire … industry worse off. In this case, the benefit from the revelation of the quality does not outweigh certification costs and the … rather than full revelation for some values of the certification costs. …

information gap, consumers can rely on certification that ensures the quality and origin of the goods. Certification can be … analyze the certification decision of the club and its welfare implication. We find that for intermediate values of … certification costs, the industry and a club of a given size have divergent incentives, and there may be overprovision of …

gap, consumers can rely on standards (e.g., certification) that ensure quality and origin of the goods. These costly …. We find that for intermediate values of certification costs, the industry and a club of a given size of certified …

Jasmine rice farm households in adopting GI certification. Primary data of 370 Thai Jasmine rice farm households were … farm households to adopt GI certification. …

factors contributing to merchandisers’ salaries and their interest in establishing a certification process. Interestingly …

certification compared to conventional coffee was analyzed by independen t-test. Increased production of arabica coffee could be …

Who does, and who should initiate costly certification by a third party under asymmetric quality information, the buyer …-induced certification acts as an inspection device, whence seller-induced certification acts as a signalling device. Seller …-induced certification maximizes the certifier's profit and social welfare. This suggests the general principle that certification is, and …