This paper analyzes conditions for strong rationality of the equilibrium in a linear/Gaussian model of a competitive commodity market, where firms are differentially informed about costs of production and the precision of private information is endogenously acquired. A Rational Expectations...

Do couples share the same values? The social sciences have mainly concentrated on comparing the socioeconomic characteristics of spouses, but rarely their prefer- ences to risk and time. In this paper, we use conventional measurements and an original method of scoring. We nd that spouses are...

We consider hybrid procedures: a first step of reducing the game by iterated elimination of weakly dominated strategies (IEWDS) followed by a second step of applying an equilibrium refinement. We show that the set of perfect/proper outcomes of a reduced normal-form game might be larger than the...

Some historians argue that the history of economic thought (HET) is useful and important to economists and that historians should remain in economics departments. Others believe that historians’ initiatives toward economists are doomed in advance to failure and that they should instead ally...

This paper analyzes a sequential voting mechanism that eliminates at each round one candidate, until only one of them is left (the winner). The candidates are the voters and they only differ across their skill level. The payoff allocated to the winner depends on the sequence of elimination of...

We study the implications of conformism among analysts in a CARA Gaussian model of the market for a risky asset, where a trader's in- formation is a message sent by an analyst. Conformism increases the weight of the public information in the messages, decreasing their in- formativeness. More...

It is commonly accepted that the multiplicity of equilibria is ubiquitous in preference aggregation games with any voting method. We prove that this multiplicity is greatly reduced under some mild restrictions over social preferences when each voter can vote for as many candidates as she wishes...

We build a theory of political turnover in autocracies where citizens can only express their political preferences to remove the autocrat through costly mass protest. The disenfranchised are imperfectly informed about the autocrat's choice of economic institution. Workers only observe economic...

This paper considers the role of asymmetric information in a political agency theory of autocratic economic policy-making. Within the context of a static game, we analyze the strategic interaction between a self-interested elite ruling class, who may extract rent ineciently through hidden...

How does within couples'time-use interactions generate welfare in the family ? In this paper we model economies of scale in time use. Following Browning, Chiappori and Lewbel (2006), we allow intra- household bargaining power to affect the distribution of welfare gains in the family. We estimate...