We consider the combine use of environmental taxation and technological standards of abatement. While it is not necessary to regulate technology adoption under complete information, we show that the environmental agency has to impose a technological standard when monitoring emissions is costly...

We analyze a two-sender quality-signaling game in a duopoly model where goods are horizontally and vertically differentiated. While locations are chosen under quality undertainty, firms choose prices and advertising expenditures being privately informed about their thpes. We show that pure price...

In this paper we consider a two periods model of cropping using irrigation. The farmer takes two kind of decisions, one related to the level of investment in irrigation capacity and the other one to the irrigation level in each period. In the first period, decisions are taken under uncertainty...

We analyse vertical contracts between manufacturers and a common retailer in a channel including the uptstream input market. The oligopsonistic behavior of manufacturers on the ustream market provides a new explanation for predatory accomodation. With two-parts tariff, we show that joint profit...

We analyse the efficiency of output and input incentives schemes in an agency model in both cases of certain and uncertain production.

In this paper, we show formally that cooperatives can possess an informational -and hence cost- advantage compared to For Profit Firms (FPFs). Hence the standard practice of modeling the cooperative and the FPF as having identical cost structures appears to be theoretically unsound. The...