Appropriation possibilities significantly alter economic fundamentals in a production and exchange economy. This is the primary lesson of our model, which combines Ricardian trade and the potential for predator/prey behavior. The model shows how conflict can be subdued by mutual gains from...

We examine incentives to seize and defend goods offered for trade in an Edgeworth box economy. Appropriation possibilities generate an equilibrium of coerced redistribution and voluntary trade in a reduced box. Potential mutual gains remain untaken because the prospect of piracy creates a price...

Grossman and Kim's (1996) predator-prey model predicts as the effectiveness of offense against defense increases, the equilibrium level of appropriation will vary from zero to full to partial predation. We test the prediction using a repeated single-play protocol with eight decision periods. The...

Prominent conflict datasets used in the social scientific study of war and peace are summarized. These include datasets for armed conflicts (e.g., COW and UCDP/PRIO wars and sub-war conflicts), terrorism (e.g., GTD and ITERATE terrorist incidents), and events (e.g., WEIS, KEDS, and VRA...

When rational choice theory is applied to the study of terrorism, it is important that attention be given to the derived principles of constrained utility maximization. Particularly useful is the Slutsky equation, which rigorously analyzes the quantity response in one activity to a price change...

We test Bolton's (1991) comparative bargaining model by conducting an ultimatum experiment with two primary treatments distinguished only by their payoff rules. In the first treatment subjects play a series of basic ultimatum games. Because responders can increase comparative income by rejecting...

When appropriation possibilities are overlooked, the predictions of standard trade models can be misleading. Trade theorists need a new class of models designed to investigate the effects of appropriation possibilities on exchange. Toward this end we incorporate appropriation possibilities into...

We derive the payoffs of a hawk-dove game based upon production, exchange, and appropriation possibilities. We then link the evolutionary equilibrium of the game to economy-wide fundamentals: production, volume of trade, security of property, welfare, and the extent of hawks in the economy....

Although conflict economics has expanded its interest post-Cold War violence, our theme is that conflict potential weaves itself into the decision of consumers, producers, and traders in ways that economists have essentially ignored. This is the lesson of our literature review and of our model,...

The motives for the arms trade have always involved economics and politics with shifting relative importance depending on the era. In spite of the body of arms trade research that has spanned a century and has clearly recognized the importance of economic motivations, there has been surpirsingly...