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Automated Multilateral Negotiation on Multiple Issues with Private Information
Zheng, Ronghuo - 2019
In this paper, we propose and analyze a distributed negotiation strategy for a multi-agent multi-attribute negotiation … concede during the negotiation, we propose and analyze a reactive concession strategy. We demonstrate through computational … experiments that our distributed negotiation strategy yields performance sufficiently close to the Nash bargaining solution, and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012903886
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Behavioral Modeling of Sequential Bargaining Games : Fairness and Limited Backward Induction
Qu, Xia - 2013
Experiments show that in sequential bargaining games (SBG), subjects usually deviate from game-theoretic predictions. Previous explanations have focused on considerations of fairness in the offers, and social utility functions have been formulated to model the data. However, a recent explanation...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013078226
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Endogenous heterogeneous gender norms and the distribution of paid and unpaid work in an intra-household bargaining model
Hager, Theresa; Mellacher, Patrick; Rath, Magdalena - 2023
We study the impact of gender norms on the distribution of paid and unpaid labor between women and men in an intra-household bargaining model featuring endogenous social norms. In contrast to the previous literature, which assumes a homogeneous social norm, agents are connected via explicitly...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014314080
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Grid Business Models for Brokers Executing SLA-Based Workflows
Quan, Dang Minh; Altmann, Jorn - Technology Management, Economics and Policy Program … - 2010
of the broker and the negotiation strategy between users and brokers. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008511399
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Rhetoric in legislative bargaining with asymmetric information
Chen, Ying; Eraslan, Hulya - In: Theoretical Economics 9 (2014) 2, pp. 483-513
We analyze a three-player legislative bargaining game over an ideological and a distributive decision. Legislators are privately informed about their ideological intensities, i.e., the weight placed on the ideological decision relative to the weight placed on the distributive decision....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599520
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Cheap talk comparisons in multi-issue bargaining
Chakraborty, Archishman; Harbaugh, Richmond - 2002
are directly opposed on each issue. The resulting communication gains can exceed the gains from bundling previously …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010272000
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Rhetoric in legislative bargaining with asymmetric information
Chen, Ying; Eraslan, Hülya - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 9 (2014) 2, pp. 483-513
We analyze a three-player legislative bargaining game over an ideological and a distributive decision. Legislators are privately informed about their ideological intensities, i.e., the weight placed on the ideological decision relative to the weight placed on the distributive decision....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011674460
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Credible Comparisons in Multi-Issue Bargaining
Chakraborty, Archishman; Harbaugh, Rick - Economics Department, Claremont McKenna College - 2002
from bundling are in addition to the gains from bundling previously identified in the monopoly pricing literature. Applied … to negotiations between an executive and a legislature, our results imply that bundling multiple issues in a single bill …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005150896
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Rhetoric in legislative bargaining with asymmetric information
Chen, Ying; Eraslan, Hulya - In: Theoretical Economics 9 (2014) 2
We analyze a three-player legislative bargaining game over an ideological and a distributive decision. Legislators are privately informed about their ideological intensities, i.e., the weight placed on the ideological decision relative to the weight placed on the distributive decision....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010773108
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Party Formation and Competition
Ladley, Daniel; Rockey, James - Department of Economics, Leicester University - 2010
In the majority of democratic political systems, districts elect representatives, who form coalitions, which determine policies. In this paper we present a model which captures this process: A citizen-candidate model with multiple policy dimensions in which elected representatives endogenously...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008503589