In this paper we analyze a firm choice between crowdfunding and bank financing. The interplay of these two important types of financing for entrepreneurial firms has not been extensively studied in existing literature while for many entrepreneurs it is an important issue. We analyze a model...

This article analyzes crowdfunding campaigns of technology firms in England. We compare the predictions of crowdfunding theories with empirical evidence. We are particularly focused on factors of campaign success related to indirect signalling (such as the choice of campaign target) by founders...

This note compares the investment policy and managerial compensation in family and non-family firms. The model is based on one hand a manager/shareholders conflict that should be more pronounced in non-family firms. Secondly large shareholders/small shareholders conflict should play a...

These notes provide introduction to corporate finance. It discusses such topics as the difference between money and finance, limited liability and types of business organizations, types of financial decisions and corporate organizational chart and financial information vs. accounting reports

This paper considers a financing problem for an innovative firm that is launching a web-based platform. The entrepreneur, on one hand, faces a large degree of demand uncertainty onhis product and on the other hand has to deal with incentive problems of professional blockchainparticipants who...

Chatty and Saez (2004) argued that more Principal-Agent models explaining firm dividend policy are expected and subsequently offered a model of dividend policy that includes a tax on dividends and agency problems (Chatty and Saez (2007)). In this paper we extent their model by adding a tax on...

In recent years financing through the creation of an independent project company or financing by non-recourse debt has become an important part of corporate decisions. Shah and Thakor (JET, 1987) argue that project financing can be optimal when asymmetric information exists between firm's...

We consider an optimal contract between an entrepreneur and an investor, where the entrepreneur is subject to a double moral hazard problem (one being the choice of production effort and the other being earnings manipulation). Since the entrepreneur cannot entirely capture the results of his...

The literature analyzing games where some players have private information about their "types" is usually based on the duality of "good" and "bad" types (GB approach), where "good" type denotes the type with better quality. In contrast, this paper analyzes a signalling game without types...

This paper analyzes debt-equity choice for financing a two-stage investment when a firm’s insiders have private information about the firm’s expected earnings. When private information is one-dimensional (for example when short-term earnings are common knowledge while long-term earnings are...