The 2009 decision of the EU Commission imposing a €1.06 billion fine on Intel, and the subsequent judgment of the General Court (GC) upholding the decision have sparked an intense debate as to the way Article 102 TFEU should be applied. This On-Topic adds to the fervent discussion with...

This paper reviews the recent developments in the economics of industry with respect to strategic entry deterrence. Starting from Bain's (1956) classical analysis, a simple two-stage game between an incumbent firm and a potential entrant is used to present the general structure of the entry...

This paper considers the APEC and proposed EGA agreements which grant tariff concession in favor of "green" goods. We find that the practical significance of the APEC agreement should not be overestimated as it involves modest tariff concessions over a subset of goods which are not heavily...

We analyse the adjustment of price and quantity of a durable good following a hypothetical cartel formation. We find that, under rational expectations of the users about the next period price of the second-hand good, the new steady state is characterised by the same price as would prevail in a...

This paper characterizes the degree of price discretion that competing organizations (principals) award to their sales managers (agents) and examines how such discretion is affected by principals' competitive conduct, market concentration, product substitutability, and demand volatility. We lay...

This paper provides a critical review of competition policy in Switzerland. We analyse the legal statute, the institutional arrangements for its implementation and the case law since 1985. We find that the Cartel Commission, which was given wide discretion by the law, has been relatively immune...

This paper considers merger control in a common agency framework where firms and their competitors can influence the antitrust agency and where transparency - while making lobbying less effective - also implies real resource costs. We examine the performance of two alternative standards that can...

In this paper, we specify and estimate a structural model, which links product market competition and union power. The model has a two-stage setting, in which wages are determined through bargaining between management and unions in the first stage, with a price-setting market game to follow in...

This note analyzes duopoly competition in a two stage (location-price) game, while allowing each f irm to establish a couple of outlets. Both the circle and the line mo del of spatial competition are considered. The main result is clear-c ut: in equilibrium neither firm will take up the...