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Genetic testing and repulsion from chance

Hoel, Michael; Iversen, Tor; Nilssen, Tore; Vislie, Jon - 2003

A central theme in the international debate on genetic testing concerns the extent to which insurance companies should be allowed to use genetic information in their design of insurance contracts. We analyze this issue within a model with the following important feature: A person’s well-being...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010284417

The gate is open : primary care physicians as social security gatekeepers

Carlsen, Benedicte; Nyborg, Karine - 2009

Primary care physicians have two roles: the healer and the gatekeeper. We show that, due to information asymmetries, they cannot be expected to fulfill the latter role. Better gatekeepers will be poorer healers; hence all patients, both truly sick and shirkers, will strictly prefer physicians...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003823078

Identification of supplier-induced demand : what kind of consumer information matters?

Schmid, Christian - 2013

visits and the length of stay in hospitals. We find that information has a negative effect on health care utilization …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009711236

Genetic testing and repulsion from chance

Hoel, Michael; Iversen, Tor; Nilssen, Tore; Vislie, Jon - 2004

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011402443

Genetic Testing and Repulsion from Chance

Hoel, Michael; Iversen, Tor; Nilssen, Tore; Vislie, Jon - 2021

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013319297

Implementing personalized medicine with asymmetric information on prevalence rates

Antoñanzas Villar, Fernando; Juárez-Castelló, Carmelo A. - In: Health economics review 6 (2016) 35, pp. 1-8

the interaction between the hospitals and the manufacturer of a new treatment as an adverse selection problem where the … firm does not have perfect information on the prevalence across hospitals of the genetic characteristics of the patients … making them eligible to receive a new treatment. As a result of the model, hospitals with high prevalence rates benefit from …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011586604

Exit, Choice or Loyalty : Patient Driven Competition in Primary Care

Levaggi, Rosella; Rochaix, Lise - 2004

The questions addressed in this paper are related to access rules to primary care services and the potential for patient driven competition between GPs and specialists. Most of the literature on the performance of primary care has dealt with reforming payment schemes, little attention being paid...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014071531

A Taxonomy of Cream Skimming in the Provision of Hospital Care

Levaggi, Rosella - 2009

it avoid the problem of misreporting cost, but has the downside effect that, if hospitals might choose which patients to …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014071617

Hospital Health Care : Cost Reimbursement and Quality Control in a Spatial Model with Asymmetry of Information

Levaggi, Rosella - 2009

hospital care reimbursement systems will be discussed in a context where hospitals can observe patient severity and compete …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014071978

Information vs. Advertising in the Market for Hospital Care

Montefiori, Marcello - 2006

Recent health system reforms have introduced prospective payments and free choice by patients. The expected outcome is efficiency in production and a high quality level for the services provided. The former should be obtained by the prospective payment scheme; the latter by the demand mechanism,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014027461