We study numerical simulations of a standard trade model with labor mobility costs added, modeled in such a way as to generate gross flows in excess of net flows. We find that adjustment to a trade shock can take a long time with plausible values of parameter values. In our base case, for the...

We consider a dynamic Bertrand game, in which prices are publicly observed and each firm receives a privately observed cost shock in each period. Although cost shocks are independent across firms, within a firm costs follow a first-order Markov process. We analyze the set of collusive equilibria...

This paper examines how democracy affects long-run growth by influencing the quality of governance. Empirical evidence is presented first showing that measures of the quality of governance are substantially higher in more democratic countries. A generalequilibrium, endogenous growth model is...

We consider an infinitely repeated Bertrand game, in which prices are publicly observed and each firm receives a privately observed, i.i.d. cost shock in each period. We focus on symmetric perfect public equilibria (SPPE), wherein any "punishments" are borne equally by all firms. We identify a...

The random priority (random serial dictatorship) mechanism is a common method for assigning objects to individuals. The mechanism is easy to implement and strategy-proof. However this mechanism is inefficient, as the agents may be made all better off by another mechanism that increases their...

Scientific views on human variation and the relationship between humans and apes changed dramatically between 1700-1900. This paper traces the history of those changes from an initial consensus on the homogeneity of man and on casual models tied to environmental contrasts to the turn of the 20th...

This paper considers the appropriate stabilization objectives for monetary policy in a microfounded model with staggered price-setting. Rotemberg and Woodford (1997) and Woodford (2002) have shown that under certain conditions, a local approximation to the expected utility of the representative...