"Why is it difficult to restructure sovereign debt in a timely manner? In this paper we present a theory of the sovereign debt restructuring process in which delay arises as individual creditors hold-up a set- tlement in order to extract greater payments from the sovereign. We then use the...

We construct a model in which an investment opportunity arises for a first mover before it knows the identity of a second mover and in which joint location results in a negative externality. Contracts are inherently incomplete since the first mover cannot bargain over its ex ante investment...

We construct a model in which a first mover decides on its location before it knows the identity of the second mover; joint location results in a negative externality. Contracts are inherently incomplete since the first mover's initial location decision cannot be specified to an anonymous second...

One of Coase's central insights is that distinguishing between the generator and recipient of an externality is of limited value because externality problems are reciprocal. We reconsider the relevance of the identity of the generator in a model with non-contractible investment ex ante but...

We consider a setting in which the buyer's ability to hold up a seller's investment is so severe that there is no investment in equilibrium of the static game typically analyzed. We show that there exists an equilibrium of a dynamic game generating positive investment. The seller makes a...