Experience rating which is often treated as a simple adjustment cost is an original feature of the US unemployment benefit system. This Paper extensively addresses the effect of experience rating as an alternative to standard job protection. We provide a simple matching model of unemployment...

[eng] Job protection has often been blamed as a source of the poor employment performance of many European countries. Since the beginning of the 90s, much attention has been devoted to the theoretical and the empirical analysis of the consequences of labor market regulation on labor market...

In this article, the authors use a stylized model of the labor market to investigate the effects of three alternative and well-known bargaining solutions. They apply the Nash, the Egalitarian and the Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solutions in the small firm’s matching model of unemployment. To...

The design of employment protection legislation (EPL) is of particular importance in the European debate on the contours of labor-market reform. In this article we appeal to an equilibrium unemployment model to investigate the virtues of EPL reform which reduces the red tape and legal costs...

This paper studies the effects of the introduction of unemployment compensation (UC) in countries characterized by pervasive informality. We provide a simple framework to analyze the impact of UC on the allocation of workers between formal and informal activities, as well as the allocation of...

This paper provides a simple model which explains the choice between permanent and temporary jobs. This model, which incorporates important features of actual employment protection legislations neglected by the economic literature so far, reproduces the main stylized facts about entries into...

The systematic use of experience rating is an original feature of the U.S. unemployment benefit system. In most states, unemployment benefits are financed by taxing firms in proportion to their separations. Experience rating is a way to require employers to contribute to the payment of...

We consider a dual labor market with a frictional formal sector and a competitive informal sector. We show that the size of the informal sector is generally too large compared to the optimal allocation of the workers. It follows that our results give a rationale to informality-reducing policies.

This paper studies the impact of product and labor market regulations on informality and unemployment in a general framework where formal and informal firms are subject to the same externalities, differing only with respect to some parameter values. Both formal and informal firms have monopoly...