We show that, given two matchings of which say the second is stable, if (a) no firm prefers the first matching to the … increases, then there is a non-empty subset of firms and the set of workers they are assigned to under the F - optimal stable … matching, such that given any stable matching for the old two-sided matching problem and any stable matching for the new one …

We show that, given two matchings of which say the second is stable, if (a) no firm prefers the first matching to the … increases, then there is a non-empty subset of firms and the set of workers they are assigned to under the F optimal stable … matching, such that given any stable matching for the old two-sided matching problem and any stable matching for the new one …

technology and human capital are complementary, the positive assortative matching (PAM) is a stable matching under rational … marginal effects of technology and human capital, the PAM is still a rational stable matching.However, if the substitutive … matching is a rational stable matching. …

achieve a balance between exports and imports. We show that stable equilibria discourage net-exporting firms from exchange. We …

that a stable outcome in an assignment game with externalities always exists if and only if all pairs are pessimistic … structure of the set of stable outcomes. …

achieve a balance between exports and imports. We show that stable equilibria discourage net-exporting firms from exchange. We …

technology and human capital are complementary, the positive assortative matching (PAM) is a stable matching under rational … marginal effects of technology and human capital, the PAM is still a rational stable matching. However, if the substitutive … matching is a rational stable matching. …

In two-sided matching markets, stable mechanisms are vulnerable to various kinds of manipulations. This paper … investigates conditions for the student-optimal stable mechanism (SOSM) and the college-optimal stable mechanism (COSM) to be …

that a stable outcome in an assignment game with externalities always exists if and only if all pairs are pessimistic … structure of the set of stable outcomes. …

technology and human capital are complementary, the positive assortative matching (PAM) is a stable matching under rational … marginal effects of technology and human capital, the PAM is still a rational stable matching.However, if the substitutive … matching is a rational stable matching. …