This paper examines the effects of industrial concentration and other control variables on international trade in Japan's manufacturing industry for 1976-1980. The primary findings are (1) Concentration has a positive and significant impact on both export share and import share;(2) both labor...

Employing an environmentally differentiated duopoly model, we analyze how emission standards affect imports, the environment, and social welfare. We show that a strict emission standard is not necessarily import-restrictive, whereas it may possibly degrade the environment. Furthermore, we...

The free-riding issue is generally considered to be the biggest obstacle in the success of an international environmental agreement. Even without free-riding incentives, however, asymmetric information can pose a potentially significant threat in establishing a cooperative relationship. In this...

This paper looks into potential determinants of the mode of international competition in a polluting good market by analyzing a so-called timing game between two environmentally concerned governments. From the equilibrium results of our intergovernmental game based on an international duopoly...

Between 1960 and 1990 Japanese labor productivity rose from 27 percent of the U.S. to 87 percent. These productivity gains are associated with large variations in Japanese TFP. We find that movements in Japanese TFP are associated with prior movements in U.S. R&D expenditures. Model simulations...

We attempt to formulate and explain two types of self-fulfilling prophecy, called the Pygmalion effect (if a supervisor thinks her subordinates will succeed, they are more likely to succeed) and the Galatea effect (if a person thinks he will succeed, he is more likely to succeed). To this...

We consider a model with two countries in which each government redistributes income between two types of individuals (the rich and the poor). This model shows that an increase in the mobility of individuals induces intensive tax competition across countries and lowers the level of...

This paper examines whether production efficiency is attained in a capitalistic class economy where complete contracts are not available. It is shown that such an economy often fails to achieve production efficiency.

The results on the design of incentive compatible mechanisms for implementing public decisions establish that there is no general solution to the incentive problem if the mechanisms are required to be informationally decentralized. However, even when the planner possesses the knowledge of the...