We consider environments in which agents can cooperate on multiple issues and externalities are present both within and … across issues. We propose a way to extend (Shapley) values that have been put forward to deal with externalities within … issues to games where there are externalities within and across issues. We characterize our proposal through axioms that …

Economic activities, both on the macro and micro level, often entail wide-spread externalities. This in turn leads to … deciding upon the distribution of the gains (costs) of cooperation in the presence of externalities. This method is shown to be …

We consider environments in which agents can cooperate on multiple issues and externalities are present both within and … across issues. We propose a way to extend (Shapley) values that have been put forward to deal with externalities within … issues to games where there are externalities within and across issues. We characterize our proposal through axioms that …

We consider strategic issues in one-to-one matching with externalities. We show that no core (stable) mechanism is … strategy-proof, extending an impossibility result of Roth (1982) obtained in the absence of externalities. Moreover, we show … result of Demange et al. (1987) obtained in the absence of externalities …

externalities. To capture the features of inter-individual externalities, this paper constructs a new game-theoretic framework …

potential partners but also over what other matches occur. Once such externalities are considered, the set of stable matchings …

efficient, regardless of externalities created by interim actions. Otherwise, in the presence of externalities on outside …

continue to negotiate as long as there are gains from trade, and coalitions may create positive or negative externalities. The …

where contracts may impose externalities on other agents. The paper derives several properties of the Markov perfect …