We justify risk neutral equilibrium bidding in commonly known fair division games with incompleteinformation by an evolutionary setup postulating (i) minimal common knowledge, (ii) optimal responses to conjectural beliefs how others behave and (iii) evolutionary selection of conjectural beliefs...

The literature on learning in unknown environments emphasises reinforcing on actions which produce positive results. But, in some cases, success requires shifting from a currently successful actions to others. We examine, experimentally and theoretically in a very simple framework, how...

Pareto is sometimes credited with an early formulation of the ill-fated Hicks or Kaldor principles of hypothetical compensation. The basis for this claim is Pareto's 1894 article "Il massimo di utilita dato dalla libera concorrenza." However in that paper Pareto argued to the contrary, that in...

The paper provides an analysis of the impact of supply uncertainty on the formation of prices and on the seller's expected revenue in sequential first- and second-price sealed bid auctions. Attention is paid to the seller's optimal policy regarding the release or withholding of information about...

We experimentally study a class of pie-sharing games with alternating roles in which the second (and final) stage of interaction follows the rules of a private impunity game, and occurs with a certain probability only if a first-stage agreement is not reached. A large number of participants play...

The Bank of Spain uses a unique auction format to sell government bonds, which can be seen as a hybrid of a uniform and a discriminatory auction. For winning bids above the average winning bid, buyers are charged the average winning bid, otherwise they pay their respective bids. We report on an...

The paper reports on the e¤ects of one-sided imperfect information on bidding behaviour in simultaneous and sequential first-price auctions of non-identical objects when bidders have multi-unit demands. The analysis provides the following four main results. First, when different objects are to...