No abstract received.

From a special class of TU games with information cost, given by the problem of sharing the costs of facilities among users, we build a noncooperative game in which every player asks for the assessment of whom the users are. We analyze two models, "naming" game and majority decision game: the...

This paper proposes a brief review of the use of power indices in the corporate governance literature. Without losing sight of the field of application, it places the emphasis on the game-theoretic aspects of this research and on the issues that arise in this framework. It should be noted that...

In 2012, the scientific world has lost N.N. Krasovskii, an extraordinary mathematician and mechanician whose works have prominently influenced a number of mathematic fields: differential equations, optimal control, and dynamic games theory. His research had profound effects on the development of...

This introduction presents the theme of this volume, the rationale for it, and the history of the conference series from which it originated. It provides also a short description of the papers included.

We look at the basic applications of cooperative game theory to economic situations. These include bargaining and cooperative equilibria, especially as the number of players increases without bound. The core and the Shapley value are the fundamental tools for these applications. We consider the...

In this paper we introduce a new class of cooperative games. We define a characteristic function over the cycles of a digraph. We present a mathematical model for this situation and an axiomatic characterization of a solution for this class of cooperative games. This is introduced as a method to...

A cooperative TU game is said to posses a large core as defined by Sharkey [1982] if for every acceptable vector there is a smaller core vector in the game. This paper is devoted to characterization(s) of largeness of the core of a subclass of games known as k-convex games (containing the convex...

In context of the traditional Spence signaling model, the realization of a separating equilibrium ensures that each worker is allocated to the sector of the economy where they are most productive. Traditional analysis assumes, however, that the incremental returns to labor employment are...

This paper reviews the game-theoretic literature on collaborative environmental management. It begins with a survey of static models of international environmental agreements (IEAs), comparing their underlying assumptions and their results. Extensions of the basic model to allow for both...