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This paper discusses and develops "non-welfaristic" arguments on distributive justice, mainly basing upon J. Rawls and A.K. Sen, and formalizes, in cooperative production economies, "non-welfaristic" distribution rules as game forms. First, it conceptualizes Needs Principle that the distribution...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008602959
In this paper, we consider and formulate, in cooperative production economies, a social procedure for choosing fair allocation rules, basing it upon the argument of the Rawlsian two principles of justice (Rawls (1971)). First, we adopt Sen's Capability (Sen (1980, 1985)) index to evaluate...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008603019
In this paper, we consider and formulate, in cooperative production economies, a social procedure for choosing fair allocation rules, basing it upon the argument of the Rawlsian two principles of justice (Rawls (1971)). First, we adopt Sen's Capability (Sen (1980, 1985)) index to evaluate...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005639238
This paper discusses and develops "non-welfaristic" arguments on distributive justice, mainly basing upon J. Rawls and A.K. Sen, and formalizes, in cooperative production economies, "non-welfaristic" distribution rules as game forms. First, it conceptualizes Needs Principle that the distribution...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005639258
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009318739
Professor Amartya Sen has been a distinguished and influential scholar in development economics for over twenty years, and this edited volume seeks to reflect his interests, and the inspiration he has provided for others. The editors have succeeded in creating a coherent and stimulating set of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009144805
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009318716
This chapter presents a simple introduction to the main results in topological social choice theory. Given a continuous social welfare function, these results show the following: (i) Unanimity and Anonymity are incompatible; (ii) Weak Pareto and No Veto are incompatible; and (iii) Weak Pareto...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009318725
A competitive market mechanism is a prominent example of a nonbinary social choice rule, typically defined for a special class of economic environments in which each social state is an economic allocation of private goods, and individuals’ preferences concern only their own personal...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009318726
This article surveys the literature that investigates the consistency of Arrow's social choice axioms when his unrestricted domain assumptions are replaced by domain conditions that incorporate the restrictions on agendas and preferences encountered in economic environments. Both social welfare...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009318727