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Assuming a `spectrum' or ordering on the players of a coalitional game, as in a political spectrum in a parliamentary situation, we consider a variation of the Shapley value in which coalitions may only be formed if they are connected with respect to the spectrum. This results in a naturally...
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We introduce emotions into an equilibrium notion. In a mental equilibrium each player "selects" an emotional state which determines the player's preferences over the outcomes of the game. These preferences typically differ from the players' material preferences. The emotional states interact to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005064211
We analyze a model of network formation where the costs of link formation are publicly known but individual benefits are not known to the social planner. The objective is to design a simple mechanism ensuring efficiency, budget balance and equity. We propose two mechanisms towards this end; the...
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We consider a model of hierarchical organizations in which agents have the option of reducing the probability of failure by investing towards their decisions. A mechanism specifies a distribution of sanctions in case of failure across the levels of the hierarchy. It is said to be...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005585390
The primitives of a bargaining problem consist of a set, S, of feasible utility pairs and a disagree- ment point in it. The idea is that the set S is induced by an underlying set of physical outcomes which, for the purposes of the analysis, can be abstracted away. In a very influential paper...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005585408
We analyze an independent private values model where a number of objects are sold in sequential first- and second-price auctions. Bidders have unit demand and their valuation for an object is decreasing in the rank number of the auction in which it is sold. We derive efficient equilibria if...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005585411
Gradual bargaining is represented by an agenda: a family of increasing sets of joint utilities, parameterized by time. A solution for gradual bargaining specifies an agreement at each time. We axiomatize an ordinal solution, i.e., one that is covariant with order-preserving transformations of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005596266