The English version of this article is available at: "http://ssrn.com/abstract=2214674" http://ssrn.com/abstract=2214674.En estas diapositivas se discute la dificultad práctica y conceptual de la búsqueda de una estructura óptima de capital EOC. Se propone un enfoque normativo que llamamos...

La versión española de este artículo se puede encontrar en: "http://ssrn.com/abstract=2214703" http://ssrn.com/abstract=2214703.In these slides we discuss the practical and conceptual difficulty of finding an Optimal Capital Structure. We propose a normative approach we call Implicit...

Using a comprehensive sample of US banks for years 2001 to 2016, we split the pay gap between the CEO and rank-and-file employees into two: CEO pay gap and VP pay gap. We examine the effect on bank performance of the tournament incentives arising from these different pay gaps. We find that CEO...

IPO firms with high-powered CEO incentive contracts have lower failure rates in the aftermarket. Economically, an interquartile change in the distribution of CEO pay translates in a reduction of the failure risk probability by approximately 21%. The Pay Gap between the CEO and its subordinate...

This paper studies the impact of executive pensions and deferred compensation plans, collectively known as "inside debt'', on corporate failures. I find that, on average, a firm whose CEO holds a larger fraction of the firm's debt than equity (i.e., when the ratio of the CEO's inside debt...

This monograph presents existing and new research on three approaches to multiagent incentives: simpler mechanisms, robust mechanisms, and implicit contracts. The goal of all three approaches is to find theories that better explain observed institutions than the standard approach has

Traditional finance theory suggests that riskier investments should yield higher returns. Challenging this notion, anecdotal and empirical evidence suggests that highly-incented managers may take on excessive risk, leading to greater losses, while other theoretical research argues that high...

Using the pay gap between a firm’s CEO and the highest-paid CEO among similar competing firms to conceptualize the prize of winning external promotion tournaments, we document a positive relationship between external tournament incentives (ETIs) and IPO underpricing – a proxy of the cost of...

How do restrictions on labor mobility affect economic growth? We quantitatively answer this question with a dynamic agency model that jointly accounts for investment in intangible capital, knowledge spillovers, and the allocation of rents among investors and agents. Our calibration is...

In this paper, I examine whether longer duration of executive compensation influences investment decisions. I exploit a regulation designed to foster long-term orientation in executive compensation as an exogenous trigger to lengthen executives' incentive duration. I find that treated firms...