Completeness, the most commonly assumed axiom in preference theory, has not received much attention from the experimental literature. Indeed, incomplete preferences model a cognitive phenomenon (an agent's inability to compare alternatives), and therefore cannot be directly revealed through...

We propose an experimental design allowing a behavioral test of the axiom ofcompleteness of individual preferences. The central feature of our design consistsin enabling subjects to postpone commitment at a small cost. Our main result isthat preferences are significantly incomplete. We use...

Completeness, the most commonly assumed axiom in preference theory,has not received much attention from the experimental literature. Indeed,incomplete preferences model a cognitive phenomenon (an agent's inabilityto compare alternatives), and therefore cannot be directly revealed throughchoice...

We consider a modified pure public good game characterized by a pre-play negotiation stage, on which pairs of players can form binding cooperation commitments. As the introduced mechanism only supports pairwise rather than more inclusive commitments, it does not implement the efficient outcome....

This paper reports two laboratory studies designed to study the impact of public information about past departure rates on congestion levels and travel costs. Our experimental design is based on a discrete version of Arnott, de Palma, and Lindsey’s (1990) bottleneck model where subjects have...

This paper investigates market failures due to strategic delays. We test experimentally a discrete model of dynamic investment, where two privately informed agents have an option to invest at the time of their choice in the presence of waiting costs. The equilibrium outcome of our experimental...