We derive the effect of plausible deniability on asset risk premia in a dynamic setting with correlated firm values, systematic risk, and risk-averse investors. Firms optimally exercise American disclosure options, which are more valuable due to the possibility that other correlated firms may...

The investment boundaries defined by Grenadier (2002) for an oligopoly investment game determine equilibria in open-loop strategies. As closed-loop strategies, they are not equilibria, because any firm by investing sooner can preempt the investments of other firms and expropriate the growth...

Recent work uses option prices to derive lower bounds for the risk premia of the market portfolio and individual stocks. We test the bounds conditionally. We cannot reject that they are valid, but we do reject that they are tight. Using the market bounds as forecasts appears unreasonable in many...

We develop a dynamic principal-agent model in which conditioning future pay-for-performance on monitoring signals is a perfect substitute for contemporaneous pay-for-performance in providing incentives. Average pay-for-performance is higher when monitoring is less efficient, because the...