This paper presents a model in which in each of a succession of time periods the State and the private economy interact to determine rules under which the private agents will operate in the next period, and rules and resources that constrain interventions of the State in the next period. The set...

This paper shows the existence of sequential and weak-best-response equilibria for cheap-talk extensions of signaling games for a class of signaling games called communication-impervious. An example shows there are well-behaved infinite signaling games with no sequential equilibria. The...

In 1963, Anscombe and Aumann demonstrated that the introduction of an objective randomizing device into the Savage setting of subjective uncertainty considerably simplified the derivation of subjective probability from a decision maker's preferences over uncertain bets. The purpose of this paper...

Consider a society with a finite number of players. Each player has personal preferences over coalitions in which he joints. A social outcome is a coalition structure that is defined by a partition of the set of players. We study the strategy proof core and von Neumann and Morgenstern (vN&M)...

We consider allocation rules that choose both a public outcome and transfers, based on the agents' reported valuations of the outcomes. Under a given allocation rule, a bribing situation exists when one agent could pay another to misreport his valuations, resulting in a net gain to both agents....