This paper provides a characterization of dominant strategy mechanisms with quasi-linear utilities and multi-dimensional types for a variety of preference domains. These characterizations are in terms of a monotonicity property on the underlying allocation rule. -- Dominant Strategy ; Farkas...

This paper provides a characterization of dominant strategy mechanisms with quasi-linear utilities and multi-dimensional types for a variety of preference domains. These characterizations are in terms of a monotonicity property on the underlying allocation rule.

This paper highlights connections between the discrete and continuous approaches to optimal auction design with single and multi-dimensional types. We provide an interpretaion of an optimal auction design problem in terms of a linear program that is an instance of a parametric shortest path...

An absorbing game is a repeated game where some of the action combinations are absorbing, in the sense that whenever they are played, there is a positive probability that the game terminates, and the players receive some terminal payoff at every future stage. We prove that every n-player...

We propose a framework for reconciling frequentist and subjectivist views of probability. In an environment with repeated trails we show that beliefs about the possible states of nature can be represented by probabilities. Second, these probabilities will correspond to long run frequencies. In...

We consider rules that choose a location on a graph (e.g. a network of roads) based on the report of agents' symmetric, single-peaked preferences over points on that graph. We show that while a strategy-poof, onto rule is not necessarily dictatorial, the existence of a cycle on the graph grants...