The first section briefly summarizes previous results in the literature. In the second section the concept of an Evolutionary Stable Strategy (ESS) is generalized for games with equivalent strategies. Dynamic stability results equivalent to the ones for the traditional definition of an ESS are...

We propose a new concept for how to make choices in games without assuming an equilibrium. To beat the average means to obtain a higher payoff against the others than the others obtain amongst themselves, for any way in which the game might be played. Only Nash equilibrium strategies can beat...

The first section briefly summarizes previous results in the literature. In the second section the concept of an Evolutionary Stable Strategy (ESS) is generalized for games with equivalent strategies. Dynamic stability results equivalent to the ones for the traditional definition of an ESS are...

Consider a decision maker who must coordinate his decision with the occurrence of some phenomenon. In order to behave "optimally," the circumstances surrounding the occurrence of the phenomenon must be learned. However, there are natural bounds on the capabilities of perception. More...

When should one pay for delivery of a good if there are no institutions? We suggest to break up the transaction into many small rounds of investment and payment. We show that the efficient investment can be implemented in an epsilon-subgame perfect equilibrium for any given epsilon if the invest...

Regret minimizing strategies for repeated games have been receiving increasing attention in the literature. These are simple adaptive behavior rules that exhibit nice convergence properties. If all players follow regret minimizing strategies, their average joint play converges to the set of...