Let N be a finite set of players and let pi be a class of coalitions of N. We consider games with and without sidepayments such that only the coalitions in pi play essential roles but not the others. For an arbitrary pi, we get the class of all such games. The purpose of this note is to provide...

A generalization of assignment games, called partitioning games, is introduced. Given a finite set N of players, there is an a priori given subset pi of coalitions of N and only coalitions in pi play an essential role. Necessary and sufficient conditions for the non-emptiness of the cores of all...

Initially we prove the nonemptiness of the core of an n-person game without side payments called a central assignment game. Next, we provide a market model with indivisible goods but without the transferable utility assumption. Applying the first result to the market model, we prove the...

In this paper we present a model of rental housing market in which houses are treated as indivisible commodities. We provide a recursive equation which determines a competitive equilibrium and argue that we can regard the competitive equilibrium as a representative of the set of all competitive...