We derive the existence of a Walras equilibrium directly from Nash's theorem on noncooperative games. No price player is involved, nor are generalized games.

Overlapping generations models with or without production or a portfolio demand for money display a fundamental indeterminacy. Expectations matter; and they are not, in the short run, constrained by the hypotheses of agent optimization, rational expectations, and market clearing. No short run...

We build a finite horizon model with inside and outside money, in which interest rates, price levels and commodity allocations are determinate, even though asset markets are incomplete and asset deliveries are purely nominal.

In the classical general equilibrium model, agents keep all their promises, every good is traded, and competition prevents any agent from earning superior returns on investments in financial markets. In this paper I introduce the age-old problem of broken promises into the general equilibrium...

We consider a two-period model with missing assets and missing market links, in which money plays a central role and is linked to every instrument in the economy. If there are enough missing market links relative to the ratio of outside to inside money, then monetary equilibrium (ME) exists and...

We introduce grading into games of status. Each player chooses effort, producing a stochastic output or score. Utilities depend on the ranking of all the scores. By clustering scores into grades, the ranking is coarsened, and the incentives to work are changed. We first apply games of status to...

I survey the major results in the theory of general equilibrium with incomplete asset markets. I also introduce the papers in this volume and offer a few suggestions for further work.

Our purpose in this paper is to unify international trade and finance in a single general equilibrium model. Our model is rich enough to include multiple commodities (including traded and nontraded goods), heterogeneous consumers in each country, multiple time periods, multiple credit markets,...

The present crisis is the bottom of a recurring problem that I call the leverage cycle, in which leverage gradually rises too high then suddenly falls much too low. The government must manage the leverage cycle in normal times by monitoring and regulating leverage to keep it from getting too...

We build a simple model of leveraged asset purchases with margin calls. Investment funds use what is perhaps the most basic financial strategy, called "value investing," i.e. systematically attempting to buy underpriced assets. When funds do not borrow, the price fluctuations of the asset are...