We study games with strategic complementarities, arbitrary numbers of players and actions, and slightly noisy payoff signals. We prove limit uniqueness: as the signal noise vanishes, the game has a unique strategy profile that survives iterative dominance. This generalizes a result of Carlsson...

We study games with strategic complementarities, arbitrary numbers of players and actions, and slightly noisy payoff signals. We prove limit uniqueness: as the signal noise vanishes, the incomplete information game has a unique strategy profile that survives iterative dominance. This generalizes...

We study games with strategic complementarities, arbitrary numbers of players and actions, and slightly noisy payoff signals. We prove limit uniqueness: as the signal noise vanishes, the game has a unique strategy profile that survives iterative dominance. This generalizes a result of Carlsson...

We study the role of expectations when agents have a preference for segregation and households face moving frictions. In a fixed environment, there are multiple equilibria: agents' expectations determine whether an ethnic transition occurs. However, the outcome is unique if there is a...

This paper shows that the phenomenon of multiple equilibria can be fragile to the introduction of aggregate shocks. We examine a standard dynamic model of sectoral choice with external increasing returns. Without shocks, the outcome is indeterminate: there are multiple rational expectations...